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1963] COMMENTS
a timely action en desaveu1 The suggested interpretation would
make Articles 184 and 197 complementary instead of contra-
dictory, and allow a reasonable disposition of extreme cases in
which the husband in all probability never learned of the child's
birth,92 instead of making them monuments to the intransigence
of the law.
Karl W. Cavanaugh
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES
PROHIBITING THE DISSEMINATION OF
BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION
The current widespread attention given the continuing
population growth by news media' and a growing interest among
a large segment of the married population in spacing family
development has lent new impetus to examination of the con-
troversial subject of birth control. Current state statutory
provisions on the subject of contraceptives stem mainly from
the influence of the Federal Comstock Act of 1873,2 the first
important legislative effort in this area. 3  The federal provi-
sions seem absolute in their prohibitions on interstate distribu-
tion of contraceptive devices, 4 but judicial interpretation has
created many exceptions in favor of certain activities.5 A ma-
91. LA CIVIL CODE art. 209(3) may be the basis of another exception to
Article 184 in cases in which the wife is living in open concubinage with a third
party at the time of the child's conception.
92. E.g., Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Succession of
Ledet, 122 La. 220, 47 So. 506 (1908) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433,
10 So. 872 (1892). If the husband in fact never learns of the child's birth, his
heirs should be permitted to bring a regular action en desaveu. See LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 192 (1870).
1. E.g., United States News & World Report, p. 68 (May 6, 1963).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1462 (1958).
3. See Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212, 219-20 (1944), wherein the authors contend the Comstock Act
was archaic when passed, but that Congress was influenced by claims that the
nation was falling into the clutches of organized vice.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958): ". . . Every article or thing designed . . . for
preventing conception . . . [and] every description calculated to induce or incite
a person to so use or apply any such article . . . is declared to be nonmailable
matter. ... Id. § 1462: "Whoever . . . knowingly uses any . . . common carrier,
for [carriage in interstate commerce any article for preventing conception]."
5. See Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212, 221 (1944). When the Comstock Act was introduced it con-
tained exceptions for articles of contraception when prescribed by a physician.
The law as passed, however, did not contain this exception. Judicial interpreta-
tion has read many exceptions back into the law. E.g., United States v. One
Package, 86 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (physicians allowed to import or ship by
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jority of states have enacted statutes dealing with contracep-
tives - ranging from Connecticut's anti-use statute7 to mere
licensing statutes 8 - usually found under general titles of ob-
scenity and abortion. The inclusion of contraceptive regulation
within statutes directed against obscenity reflects a Victorian
attitude which equates the two subjects simply because of their
common relationship to sex; this holdover from a by-gone era
appears to have little basis of support in a modern world.9
The United States Supreme Court has yet to pass on the con-
stitutional validity of state statutes regulating the dissemination
of birth control information. 10 Several early state court deci-
sions upheld statutes limiting distribution of such information
on the rationale regulation was within the states' police power
for the protection of health and morals." Litigation has been
noticeably lacking, however, under most of the state statutes,
indicating state officials are reluctant to enforce these provi-
sions.
In one recent Arizona case 12 a nonprofit corporation was
engaged in the business of placing information about contracep-
tive devices on public display and distributing leaflets and
pamphlets discussing "methods of contraception . . .in rather
specific detail."'13 The corporation sought a judgment declaring
unconstitutional 14 under the first and fourteenth amendments
mail); Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933) (druggists not
within the bar of the statute) ; Youngs Rubber Co. v. Lee, 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1930) (act applies only to shipment for purposes of "illegal contraception").
Today it does not appear that federal laws contain any effective prohibitions on
the dissemination of birth control devices or information.
6. For a collection of state legislation on the subject, see generally Comment,
70 YALE L.J. 322, 333 (1960). See also Note, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 260, 263
(1939).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958).
8. E.g., ARK. STAT. § 82-944 (1947).
9. See generally Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population
Control in the United States, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 600 (1960) ; Com-
ment, 9 CLEV.-MAB. L. REv. 245, 257 (1960).
10. Although two cases concerning the Connecticut anti-use statute came
before the Court, it did not reach the merits of either. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
44 (1960) ; Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Further, it would appear
that a decision on this particular statute would not necessarily solve the problem
of restriction on dissemination of information about contraceptives.
11. Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917) ; People v.
Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918) ; People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163
N.Y. Supp. 682, 35 N.Y. Crim. 406 (1917); cf. McConnel v. Knoxville, 172
Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478 (1937).
12. Planned Parenthood Committee v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375
P.2d 719 (1962).
13. 375 P.2d at 724.
14. Both parties stipulated the corporation's activities were in direct con-
travention of the state's statute on contraceptives. 375 P.2d at 720.
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of the Federal Constitution a state statute15 prescribing criminal
punishment for advertising or offering services for the preven-
tion of conception. The state court upheld the constitutionality
of the statute, but limited its application to brand-name ad-
vertising;16 the corporation's activities were therefore outside
its prohibitions. Although the result seems desirable, it seems
clear that the statute was directed toward preventing the very
activity in which the corporation was engaged, and that the
Arizona court resorted to tortured construction in order to avoid
constitutional issues raised by its clear words.17
Louisiana, in company with a number of states, has laws
impliedly or expressly prohibiting birth control 8 that have
never, and in all likelihood will never, be enforced. Although
Louisiana's statute has never been judicially interpreted, opin-
ions of the Attorney General indicate the provision was designed
to prevent birth control in any form. 19 The intent of this statute
being uncertain, it is impossible to determine whether it could
be used to combat noncommercial distribution of birth control
information; however, it is doubtful whether the broad inter-
pretation of the Attorney General would stand today. Despite
strong criticism by one of the reporters, these provisions were
retained in the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942,20 possibly to
avoid controversy in the legislative consideration of the Code.
21
State regulation of noncommercial dissemination of birth
15. AniZ. REV. STAT. § 13-213 (1956) : "A person who willfully writes, com-
poses or publishes a notice or advertisement of any medicine or means for pro-
ducing or facilitating a miscarriage or abortion, or for prevention of conception,
or who offers his services by a notice, advertisement or otherwise, to assist in
the accomplishment of any such purpose, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
16. The authority of a state is much broader in reference to restrictions on
commercial advertising than with respect to other types of speech. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
17. It is generally held that this is not a legitimate method of statutory con-
struction. See Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) ; Crooks
v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930) ; Commissioner of Immigration v. Gott-
lieb, 265 U.S. 310, 313 (1924) ; Folsum v. United States, 160 U.S. 121, 127
(1895).
18. LA. R.S. 14:88 (1950) : "Distribution of abortificients is the intentional:
(1) Distribution or advertisement for distribution of any drug, potion, instrument,
or article for the purpose of producing an abortion; or (2) Publication of any
advertisement or account of any secret drug or nostrum purporting to be exclu-
sively for the use of females, for preventing conception or producing abortion or
miscarriage."
19. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. OF LA. 73 (1934-36); Ops. ATT1Y GEN. or LA. 128
(1932-34).
20. MoRow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities Lost and
Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 TUL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1942).
21. Ibid.
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control information may be vulnerable to federal constitutional
attack on two theories, both under the due process clause: first,
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in-
corporating the principle of the first amendment, protects such
dissemination of information as an aspect of personal "liberty"
against deprivation by a state; and, second, that such regula-
tion cannot reasonably be said to bear any rational relationship
to any purpose the legislature might legitimately seek to achieve
and therefore violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.22
Whether the Federal Constitution prohibits states from ex-
cluding dissemination of birth control information remains
essentially unanswered ;23 however, by upholding prior enact-
ments state courts seem to have recognized an evil and have
assumed the power to regulate exists.24 The underlying rationale
of these holdings is that restriction on information concerning
contraceptives represses unhealthy or immoral influences on the
public. 2
5
Aside from states' self-imposed limitations on the exercise
of the police power, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, borrowing from the first amendment, 26 places cer-
tain limitations on the exercise of the police power; the line,
however, between valid exercise and unconstitutional infringe-
ment has not been clearly drawn.27 It seems clear the states and
the federal government alike are severely limited in restraining
free speech,28 yet freedom of speech is not an absolute.2 9 The
thrust of Supreme Court opinions appears to be that a state may
not use its police power as a guise to suppress unpopular ideas.38
The trend is toward protecting the dissemination of all ideas,
at least so long as they have some social value.31 Generally, the
22. See generally FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 285-299 (1963).
23. See note 10 8upra, and accompanying text.
24. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
25. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
26. E.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and cases cited therein at
500.
27. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See also Mehler, Constitu-
tional Free Speech v. State Police Power, 33 DICTA 145, 146 (1956).
28. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).
29. Id. at 485.
30. Martin v. Strauthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See generally Mehler, Con-
8titutional Free Speech v. State Police Power, 33 DICTA 145 (1956).
31. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). In Winters v. United
States, 354 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), the Court indicated that it was not even essen-
tial that the information have any social value at all.
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constitutional protection is not extended, however, to expression
of ideas that infringe upon "the limited area of more important
interests. '32 To date these "more important interests" have
been found only in such things as preservation of the govern-
ment from violent overthrow.3 3 The Court has repeatedly re-
fused to recognize overriding interests of the state in dissemina-
tion of information cases.3 4
Recently, the protection of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments has been extended to protect even the activities of an
association in encouraging litigation in state courts.35 Little
extension of the Court's present tendencies would appear neces-
sary to find distribution of information on birth control a con-
stitutionally protected activity, and thus beyond regulation by
the state police power.
Whether or not noncommercial dissemination of birth control
information is protected against state regulation as within the
realm of constitutionally protected free expression, the four-
teenth amendment due process clause still might afford it pro-
tection as an element of personal liberty by the more general
requirement of that clause that there be an at least arguably
rational nexus between the means employed by state regulation
and a purpose within the legislature's power to pursue.3 6 It is
not enough in itself that this nexus exist, for in addition, states
will not be allowed to reach a legitimate end in an unreasonable
fashion.3 7
The end sought by states in restricting noncommercial dis-
tribution of birth control information appears to be elimination
of what a legislature has deemed unhealthy and immoral in-
32. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
33. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Even considering cases
decided prior to the "balancing test" of the Dennis case, the interests that were
found to justify restrictions were of substantial magnitude, and typically involved
national security or internal security of a state. E.g., Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (interference with wartime conscription program). Even
under earlier standards, there seems to be little reason to believe that birth control
information would involve such a danger to put it outside the realm of con-
stitutionally protected expression.
34. See generally Mehler, Constitutional Free Speech v. State Police Power,
33 DICTA 145 (1956).
35. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 83 Sup. Ct. 328 (1963).
36. In some cases the Supreme Court has looked behind legislative findings
and held that the state action did not have a reasonable relation to the- admitted
end which the state was seeking to attain. E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945) ; cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
37. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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fluences;88 the means, criminal sanctions for distributing such
information. In clear contradiction to the legislative finding
the majority of the medical profession profess health would be
better served by removing restrictions on birth control informa-
tion.39 Since birth control may be medically expedient for some
women, restricting procurement of information about birth con-
trol is obviously inconsistent with protection of their health.
40
At best, the moral argument appears tenuous as it is yet to be
proved that banning information on birth control tends to pre-
serve morality or that lifting a ban would have any adverse
effect on the morality of the population.41 It seems a court
might well find the statutes under consideration to lack the
necessary nexus and thus beyond the general police power of
the states.
The mere existence of such statutes on the books, whether
enforced or not, tends to stifle the spread of information ap-
parently no longer considered undesirable by a majority of the
population. 42 It is submitted that anti-birth control statutes are
of little present value and remain only as a possible source of
future difficulty to the public and the courts. In addition, the
prevalence of statutes regulating the use or dissemination of
birth control information in many states, coupled with the im-
probability of legislative action to modernize the law in this
area,43 dictates the conclusion that the constitutionality of such
statutes will be determined in the near future. Since it appears
the only real value of these statutes is protection against the
dangers of indiscriminate commercial advertising - a danger
which is adequately shielded by existing obscenity statutes - it
is urged that courts face the clear constitutional issues raised
and declare these statutes violative of the Federal Constitution.
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.
38. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
39. See Report of Committee To Study Contraceptive Practices and Related
Problems, 108 J. AM. MEDICAL Ass'N 2217 (1937).
40. Ibid.
41. John-Stevas, A Roman Catholic View of Population Control, 25 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 445, 456 (1960).
42. Cf. Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraceptives, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212, 219 (1944) (indicates over 90 percent of American people use
contraceptive techniques without regard for the applicable laws).
43. Id. at 221. It should be noted, however, that Colorado has recently amended
its obscenity statutes to remove any reference to contraceptives. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 40-9-17 (1961).
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